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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
  
 This appeal arises from a land use dispute between 
Jeffrey DePolo, a federally licensed amateur or “ham” radio 
enthusiast, and the Township of Tredyffrin (“Township”). 
DePolo attempted to have the Township’s Zoning Hearing 
Board of Appeals (“ZHBA”) approve a 180-foot radio 
antenna tower on his property so that he could communicate 
with other ham radio operators around the world.  The 
property is surrounded by mountains or hills, and he claimed 
a shorter tower would not allow him to reliably communicate 
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with other ham radio operators.  The ZHBA denied 
permission for a 180-foot tower, but agreed to a tower that 
was 65-feet tall.  The ZHBA viewed that intermediate height 
as a reasonable accommodation under the applicable zoning 
ordinance. 
  
 DePolo did not appeal that decision to the Chester 
Court of Common Pleas as is allowed under state law.  
Instead, he filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He claims that the 
Township’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited any building 
taller than 35-feet, is preempted as enacted and as applied 
under the applicable federal regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b), 
and the closely related FCC declaratory ruling, known as 
PRB-1. The District Court granted motions to dismiss by the 
Township’s Board of Supervisors (“BOS”) and the ZHBA 
based upon its conclusion that the 65-foot variance offered by 
the ZHBA was a reasonable accommodation. The District 
Court also concluded that the Township’s zoning ordinance 
was not preempted by PRB-1.  
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that DePolo’s 
failure to appeal the ZHBA’s determination to state court 
rendered the decision final and that, given the unique 
procedural history of this case, we must afford the ZHBA’s 
final judgment the same preclusive effect that it would have 
had in state court.  It is therefore not reviewable in this suit. 
 
I. 
 
 This dispute results from the frequent tension arising 
from local land use regulations. Local municipalities enact 
zoning ordinances to ensure the health, safety and general 
welfare of those residing within the municipality by 
regulating activities within the municipality.  This typically 
involves creating various districts within the municipality and 
then regulating the use of the land and building type within 
those districts.1  The land use regulations also usually provide 
                                              
1  For a comprehensive background and explanation of local 
land use law and zoning, see Gerald S. Dickinson, 
Inclusionary Eminent Domain, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 854-55 
(2014) (explaining that “[a]s land was acquired and 
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that one or more administrative agencies of the local 
municipality are the appropriate forum for resolving disputes 
arising from these regulations.  Accordingly, local 
governments are usually responsible for establishing 
mechanisms and processes to reconcile the competing 
interests of landowners and their neighbors.  This is typically 
done through zoning ordinances, which are administered by a 
zoning officer and enforced by a quasi-judicial state 
administrative agency known as a zoning hearing board.2 
   
 Amateur radio operators, or “hams,” often find that 
zoning ordinances inhibit the use of their own land by 
limiting the size of permitted radio towers to an extent that 
precludes all (or nearly all) amateur communications. Hams 
have an interest in maintaining successful amateur 
communications and in sustaining a strong network of radio 
amateurs.  Concomitantly, the towers that are necessary for 
reliable radio communication may impede the scenic view of 
neighbors, pedestrians or drivers.  Moreover, concerns that 
such towers could fall onto nearby residences could 
theoretically decrease property values. 
 
 However, disputes such as the one at the center of this 
appeal affect more than local interests because the federal 
government also has an interest in preserving amateur radio 
communications.  Hams who broadcast using these towers 
afford the federal government reliable emergency 
preparedness, national security, and disaster relief 
communications. Therefore, federal interests are furthered 
when local land use regulations do not unduly restrict the 
construction of these towers.  The result is a “perfect storm” 
                                                                                                     
redeveloped in the suburbs, local officials and zoning boards 
made decisions to regulate and control the land density in 
accordance with desired local health, safety and welfare 
standards…The land could be zoned for purposes of single-
family or multi-family residential housing, commercial 
property or light industrial.”). 
2 Robert S. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, § 
1.2.2. (noting that the zoning hearing board reviews appeals 
from the municipal zoning officer’s denial of permits, hears 
requests for special exceptions and variances, and may 
declare a zoning provision invalid). 
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for conflict because there is a direct correlation between a 
ham’s antenna height and an ability to properly transmit 
signals.3 The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
regulation 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b) concerns amateur radio 
service. The applicable portion of the FCC’s regulation 
explains that:  
 
Except as otherwise provided herein, a station 
antenna structure may be erected at heights and 
dimensions sufficient to accommodate amateur 
service communications. (State and local 
regulation of a station antenna structure must 
not preclude amateur service communications. 
Rather, it must reasonably accommodate such 
communications and must constitute the 
minimum practicable regulation to accomplish 
the state or local authority's legitimate purpose. 
See PRB–1, 101 FCC 2d 952 (1985) for 
details.)4 
 
As indicated by the language of this regulation, the FCC 
ruling, PRB-1, must be examined to obtain a more complete 
understanding of the regulation’s application.  
 
 The FCC issued PRB-1 in 1985 in an attempt “to strike 
a balance between the federal interest in promoting amateur 
operations and the legitimate interests of local governments in 
regulating local zoning matters.”5 Indeed, this ruling weighs 
local government, federal government, and amateur radio 
operator interests, and has a limited, rather than complete, 
federal preemptive effect on local zoning ordinances. Thus, a 
zoning ordinance is preempted when a local municipality fails 
to apply the land use regulation in a manner that reasonably 
accommodates amateur communications. The federal courts 
that have interpreted PRB-1 have upheld this preemptive 
effect.6 
                                              
3 Pentel v. City of Mendota Heights, 13 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th 
Cir.1994). 
4 47 CFR § 97.15(e). 
5 PRB–1 ¶ 22. 
6 See, e.g., Evans v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of 
Boulder, 994 F.2d 755, 760–61 (10th Cir.1993); Thernes v. 
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 In publishing PRB-1, the FCC did not specify a 
minimum height below which local governments must allow 
for radio towers. Rather, as the FCC has explained, PRB-1 
provides that “local regulations which involve placement, 
screening, or height of antennas based on health, safety, or 
aesthetic considerations must be crafted to accommodate 
reasonably amateur communications, and to represent the 
minimum practicable regulation to accomplish the local 
authority’s legitimate purpose.”7 
 
 Notwithstanding PRB-1’s somewhat vague language, 
several principles emerge.  First, local municipalities must 
reasonably accommodate amateur communications. Second, 
zoning ordinances should be the minimum practicable 
restrictions which accomplish the local municipalities’ 
legitimate purposes. Third, local municipalities may not ban 
all amateur communications towers. Finally, the FCC has 
explicitly declined to regulate the specific permissible heights 
for antenna towers. 
 
II. 
 
 DePolo’s property is an R1/2 residential zoning district. 
On November 25, 2013, DePolo submitted an application to 
the Township zoning officer requesting a building permit to 
construct a 180-foot tower on his property. His application 
was denied by the zoning officer who concluded that Section 
208-18(G) of the zoning ordinance limited structures in the 
R½ Residence Zoning District to 35-feet.8  Notwithstanding 
that restriction, however, the zoning officer offered DePolo a 
permit to construct a 65-foot tower. DePolo rejected this 
proposal and appealed the denial of his application to the 
ZHBA.  
                                                                                                     
City of Lakeside Park, 779 F.2d 1187, 1188–89 (6th 
Cir.1986) (per curiam); Williams v. City of Columbia, 906 
F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir.1990); Howard v. City of Burlingame, 
937 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1991); Pentel, 13 F.3d at 1261. 
7 PRB-1, 101 FCC 2d 952, 960 Fed.Reg. (1985). 
8 Tredyffrin Zoning Ordinance, § 208-18, 19(G). § 208-113. 
“Area, bulk and height regulations relating to dwellings: The 
height of any building shall not exceed 35 feet.”  
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 His appeal was accompanied by a variance application 
in which he asked the ZHBA to allow him to engage in an 
activity that was otherwise prohibited by the zoning 
ordinance.9 DePolo’s variance application, if granted, would 
have allowed him to erect a tower that exceeded the height 
restriction in the ordinance.10 The ZHBA held hearings over a 
total of five days between March and June 2014. During those 
hearings, DePolo offered expert reports and testimony to 
support his contention that the zoning officer erred in refusing 
to issue the requested permit. He offered the testimony to 
support his claim that, because of the surrounding 
topography, he needed an antenna tower of 180-feet to be 
able to ensure reliable radio communications. 
 
 At the conclusion of the hearings, on October 23, 
2014, the ZHBA granted DePolo a variance for a 65-foot 
tower, even though he withdrew his application for a variance 
prior to the conclusion of the ZHBA hearing. The ZHBA 
concluded that DePolo’s proposed 180-foot tower was “not 
compatible” with the surrounding residential neighborhood 
and would create an adverse visual impact on the 
neighborhood.  The ZHBA also concluded that the tower’s 
“height, mass, and latticework design” was “of a type 
universally associated with. . . a factory area or industrialized 
complex” and posed a safety hazard to neighboring properties 
because its fall radius extended well into those properties. 
                                              
9 While landowners are ordinarily not permitted to violate 
perfectly valid land use regulations, the variance is a 
necessary legal mechanism to respond to imperfect 
topographical conditions that the ordinance does not 
adequately address. A variance in Pennsylvania, where 
DePolo’s claim arises, is usually granted if the landowner 
establishes by evidence that (1) the physical features of the 
property are such that it cannot be used for a permitted 
purpose; or (2) that the property can be conformed for a 
permitted use only at a prohibitive expense; or (3) that the 
property has no value for any purpose permitted by the 
zoning ordinance. Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 
of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249, 721 A.2d 43 (1998). 
10 Robert S. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, § 
1.2.1.   
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While acknowledging that the PRB-1 still gave local 
municipalities authority to regulate the height of structures, 
the ZHBA noted that the municipality may forbid the 
construction and installation of antennas that are associated 
with those found in a factory area or an industrialized 
complex.11 The ZHBA also noted that a 180-foot tower 
greatly exceeds the height of the residences in the area.12 The 
ZHBA explained its rejection of DePolo’s preemption claim 
as follows: 
 
Regardless, where the height limitations of the 
Zoning Ordinance are not absolute and can, by 
the very language of the Zoning Ordinance and 
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 
be varied or modified, they cannot be 
considered absolute or unvarying. Therefore, 
§208-18.G of the Zoning Ordinance is not 
invalid. 
 
Rather than appeal that decision to the Chester County Court 
of Common Pleas as provided under the state regulatory 
scheme, DePolo filed this suit in federal court. He now claims 
that the ZHBA’s 65-foot variance and the zoning ordinance’s 
fixed and firm height restriction of 35-feet, as enacted and as 
applied, was preempted by PRB-1.  
 
 The BOS and the ZHBA moved to dismiss DePolo’s 
suit for failure to state a claim. The District Court agreed and 
granted the motions.  It held that the Township’s proposed 
65-foot variance was a valid and reasonable accommodation 
for DePolo’s 180-foot tower request and held that the 
Township’s local zoning ordinance was not preempted by 
                                              
11 In the Matter of Modification and Clarification of Policies 
and Procedures Governing Siting and Maintenance of 
Amateur Radio Antennas and Support Structures, and 
Amendment of Section 97.15 of the Commission’s Rules 
Governing the Amateur Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R 22151, 
22154 (F.C.C. 2000). 
12 The ZHBA stated that “to the extent that the Zoning Officer 
did not have the authority to grant a permit for a tower 65 feet 
in height, the Zoning Hearing Board does have such authority 
and hereby grants said permit for a 65 ft. tower.” 
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PRB-1. The District Court was also troubled by DePolo’s 
insistence that a 180-foot tower was necessary to satisfy the 
FCC’s reasonable accommodation requirements, and 
exhorted the “parties to work together to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution.”13  No such solution was achieved. This 
appeal followed.  
 
III. 
 
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A 
District Court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
is reviewed de novo.14 Accordingly, we assume the truth of 
the factual allegations and draw every reasonable inference in 
favor of DePolo. We have yet to consider the effect of PRB-1 
on local land use disputes. Moreover, this is the first time in 
the 30-year history of PRB-1 that a District Court has 
dismissed a preemption claim under § 97.15(b) pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
 
 Although we have not decided a PRB-1 preemption 
claim, we touched upon it in Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 
843 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1988).  There, an amateur radio 
operator brought action against the Borough of River Edge, 
its zoning officer, and members of the planning board, 
challenging the legality of the prohibition of a 40-foot 
transmission tower. The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey abstained under Burfod v. Sun Oil 
Co.,15 and we held that abstention was improper.  We 
explained that abstention was unnecessary because land use 
regulation was not so technical that it required the District 
Court to enmesh itself in a highly specialized local regulatory 
scheme.  Although DePolo suggests that we should decide 
this case on the merits and hold that a 12(b)(6) dismissal is 
                                              
13 Pentel, 13 F.3d at 1266. 
14 Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014). 
15 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) (rather than a federal court 
becoming enmeshed in an intricate state regulatory scheme, 
“equitable discretion of the federal courts should be exercised 
to give [the state] courts the first opportunity to consider it[]” 
because “sound respect for the independence of state action 
requires the federal equity court to stay its hand.”).  
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simply not appropriate here, the procedural posture of this 
case precludes our review of the merits of his claims.  
 
  We have explained that “in determining whether a 
litigant has been given a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate 
a claim, we must take into account the possibility of appellate 
review” because a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
“includes the possibility of a chain of appellate review.”16  
The ZHBA is a state administrative agency acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity. It resolved this dispute by issuing a written 
determination containing final findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  While DePolo was aggrieved by the 
ZHBA’s decision limiting the variance to 65-feet, he had 
adequate opportunity to litigate the matter beyond the ZHBA 
by appealing to the appropriate Court of Common Pleas 
within thirty days of the ZHBA’s decision.17  Rather than do 
that, DePolo filed this suit in the District Court, and allowed 
the thirty-day appeal period under state law to expire. This 
was fatal to his ability to obtain federal review of his claim.18  
                                              
16 Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. Orange & Rockland Utils., 
Inc., 159 F.3d 129, 137 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
17 53 Pa.C.S. § 11002-A (“All appeals from all land use 
decisions . . . shall be taken to the court of common pleas of 
the judicial district wherein the land is located.”); See also 
Dickinson, Inclusionary Eminent Domain 873 (discussing the 
appeal process, noting that a developer or landowner whose 
permit or variance request is denied may appeal the local 
zoning board’s decision in state court.). 
18 We acknowledge that this decision leaves amateur radio 
enthusiasts with limited avenues into federal court. DePolo 
could have appealed the ZHBA’s decision and stayed the 
matter in state court, while his federal claims were resolved.  
That would have allowed the District Court to narrowly 
address the question of preemption. Eichenlaub v. Twp. of 
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004); See, e.g., 
MacMillan v. City of Rocky River, 748 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (radio-operator plaintiff appealed zoning 
board decision, secured stay, and filed federal complaint to 
resolve preemption claim); Chedester v. Town of Whately, 
279 F.Supp.2d 53 (2003)(amateur radio enthusiast brought 
suit in both state and federal court simultaneously and District 
Court decided to wait until the state court had ruled). 
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DePolo actually withdrew his request for a variance before 
the ZHBA and then failed to challenge its factual findings or 
legal conclusions in the forum provided under state law. He is 
therefore now bound by the final judgment of the ZHBA.19 Its 
ruling is a final judgment on the merits that is entitled to 
preclusive effect in federal court.20 Accordingly, we will 
dismiss this appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
Alternatively, the FCC has enforcement powers, conferring 
jurisdiction on the District Courts of the United States “upon 
application of the Attorney General of the United States at the 
request of the Commission, alleging a failure to comply with 
or a violation of any of the provisions.” 47 U.S.C. § 401.  
19 Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 283 (3d Cir. 2012). 
20 Id. See Crossroads Cogeneration Corp., 159 F.3d at 135 
(noting that “factual findings of state agencies should be 
given the same preclusive effect they would be accorded in 
the courts of that state.”)(citing Elliott, 478 U.S. at 
797); Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 189 (“Decisions of state 
administrative agencies that have been reviewed by state 
courts are…given preclusive effect in federal courts.”); Caver 
v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir.2005). 
